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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN HENLINE, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
-v-
SAMUEL W. SMITH, 
Warden, Utah State 
Prison, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
Case No. 14264 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Shawn Henline, was originally 
incarcerated after pleading guilty to the crime of 
attempted theft of property from a person. Rather 
than taking an appeal of his plea of guilty to this 
court he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
He now appeals from a judgment granting respondent's 
motion to dismiss appellant's petition for writ of 
habeas corpus entered in the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
- 1 -
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court granted respondent's 
motion to dismiss appellant's petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court 
affirming the decision rendered by the trial judge 
dismissing appellant's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant was charged with robbery in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-51-1 in "that on or 
about the 19th day of April, 197 3, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the said Shawn Henline robbed Mary 
LeVon Lawrence"(T.D.51). During arraignment, in 
January, 19 74, while represented by counsel, appellant 
entered a guilty plea to the lesser crime of atterapted 
theft of property from a person (T.A.5). Appellant 
testified that he discussed his plea concerning "this 
lesser, included offense with the theft of property 
from the person of Mrs. Lawrence/' and was aware 
of the possibility of a five year prison sentence 
and that he was entitled to a jury trial with its 
accompanying rights and privileges (T.A. 3,4). In 
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addition, appellant testified that no promises or 
threats had been made to induce him to plead guilty 
to this charge and that he was not under the 
influence of any drugs or alcohol or had any mental 
or physical defects that would prevent him from 
understanding that he was pleading guilty of his 
own free will and volition (T.A.4). 
Approximately four months following his 
arraignment, after various psychological tests had 
been completed and other charges against appellant 
had been dropped, appellant was brought for sen-
tencing. All this time appellant motioned the court 
to withdraw his previous guilty plea on the grounds 
that it was involuntarily made and that appellant 
had not pleaded guilty to the crime of attempted theft 
of property from a person. Appellant1s motion was 
denied and he was sentenced to serve in the Utah 
State Prison an indeterminate term as provided by law 
for the third degree felony of attempted theft of 
property from a person (T.A. 5, T.S. 3). 
In accordance with appellant's brief, 
respondent uses the following abbreviations: T.A. 
means transcript of arraignment; T.S. means transcript 
- 3 -
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of sentencing; and T.D. means transcript of documents. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS CORRECTLY SENTENCED AND THE 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THE VALUE 
OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN AND THE DEGREE OF THE OFFENSE 
BECAUSE APPELLANT PLEADED GUILTY TO THE CRIME. OF 
ATTEMPTED THEFT OF PROPERTY FROM A PERSON RATHER 
THAN ATTEMPTED THEFT. 
Although it appears that the appellant has 
couched his argument in terms of legal issues, it is 
clear that the agreement is premised simply on a single 
factual assertion. The only real question is to which 
crime appellant pleaded guilty: attempted theft 
of property from a person or merely attempted theft 
of property. For if appellant pleaded guilty to the 
crime of attempted theft of property from a person, 
then a determination of the value of the property and 
the degree of the offense is irrelevant under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (iv) (1953), as amended. 
Appellant was charged with robbery in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-51-1 (1953), in 
"that on or about the 19th day of April, 19 73, in Salt 
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Lake County, State of Utah, the said Shawn Henline 
robbed Mary LaVon Lawrence" (T.D. 51). In January, 
19 74, appellant entered a guilty plea to the lesser 
crime of attempted theft of property from a person 
(T.A. 5). By pleading guilty to this lesser crime 
under the old code punishment by imprisonment was 
reduced from a term of five years to life forhis second 
degree felony to a term of not more than twenty years. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-51-3, 76-1-31 (1) (1953). 
However, as a further incentive to appellant pleading 
guilty, the new Utah Criminal Code had become effec-
tive between the times of appellant's arrest and 
arraignment, and provided that punishment could be 
determined under the provisions of the new Code. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103(2)(1953), as amended. 
Under the new criminal code an attempt to commit a 
second degree felony was a felony of the third degree. 
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102(3)(1953), as amended) 
and in accordance with § 76-3-203 (3) (1953) , as amended, 
appellant could be and was sentenced only to a term 
not to exceed five years. The prosecution also agreed 
to drop additional charges against appellant by the 
time of his sentencing. 
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It is argued by the appellant that he 
pleaded guilty to the crime of attempted theft 
rather than the crime of attempted theft from a 
parson, based on two excerpts from the transcript 
where the trial judge stated only the v/ords "attempted 
theft" (T.A. 5, T.S.8). Notwithstanding this language 
it is evident that to be correctly understood this 
language must be considered in the context of the 
judge's remarks and in the context of the proceed-
ings themselves. For example, following appellant's 
testimony concerning the nature of his guilty plea, 
the trial judge asked what his plea was "to the lesser 
included offense of theft of property from the 
person - - .!! (T.A. 5). At this point the prosecutor 
interrupted the judge to say "attempted theft of 
property,", indicating that the judge had omitted 
the word "attempted!'' - a crucial factor since the 
entire purpose behind the plea was to allow the 
mere attempt as a basis for conviction. Recognizing 
his omission, the trial judge exclaimed, "Excuse me, 
attempted theft" (T.A. 5). It is clear that the judge 
was not discussing simply the crime of attempted 
theft, but that he wanted to be correct in asking 
for appellant's plea concerning attempted theft of 
- 6 -
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property from a person. It is apparent that appellant 
is grasping on to language which cannot reasonably be 
understood as appellant suggests. Furthermore/ the 
degree and nature of the crime had already been expli-
citly stated several times. Appellant1s own attorney 
expressly asked appellant if he had discussed a 
guilty plea to the "lesser, included offense with the 
theft of property from the person of Mrs. Lawrence." 
(T.A. 3). The prosecutor also expressly stated 
that "In this case, the offense would be theft, 
attempted theft of property from the person of Mrs. 
Mary Lawrence, which would make that an offense under 
the new code a third degree felony (T.A. 2). 
The trial judge also used the words "attempted 
theft" when appellant was sentenced. Following 
appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the 
court focused on the question of whether or not appel-
lant should be allowed to withdraw his plea. Finding 
no legal reason why the court should not have sentenced 
appellant at the time, the judge sentenced appellant 
to "serve in the Utah State Prison an indeterminate 
term as provided by law for the third degree felony 
of attempted theft." (T.S. 8). Clearly, it seems 
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reasonable that the judge was merely reaffirming 
appellant's previous decision to plead guilty, and not 
focusing on the elements of the crime. This is par-
ticularly true since all parties and the court were 
aware that appellant originally pleaded guilty to 
attempted theft of property from a person. Since it 
is clear that appellant pleaded guilty to the crime of 
attempted theft of property from a person, and 
not simply attempted theft, as appellant has errone-
ously tried to assert, the remaining aruments become 
irrelevant. Thus, the court properly noted that 
any determination of the value of property was 
unnecessary because the theft was from another person 
(T.A. 2). Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(iv) (1953), as 
amended. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT1S GUILTY PLEA WAS MADE VOLUNTARILY 
AND INTELLIGENTLY WITH AN EFFECTIVE UNDERSTANDING OF 
THE CONSEQUENCE OF HIS PLEA. 
In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 
90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d47(1970), the court discussed 
the standards of a guilty plea which is given volun-
tarily and intelligently. To be voluntary a guilty 
pleas must be entered: 
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". . .by one fully aware of 
the direct consequences, includ-
ing the actual value of any corn-
mi traents made to him by the court, 
prosecutor or his own counsel. . . . " 
Id. at 75 5. 
Such a plea will stand unless "induced by threats,. . . 
misrepresentations, or improper promises. . • .ff Id* 
The fact that the guilty plea was encouraged by the 
possibility of a lighter sentence is not improper* 
The restrictions upon the State are: 
11
 . . .the agents of the State . 
may not produce a plea by actual or 
threatened physical harm or by mental 
coercion overbearing the will of the 
defendant." Id. at 750. 
Another element necessary to a valid guilty 
plea is the requirement that the record show affirma-
tively that the defendant who pled guilty did so 
voluntarily. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 
89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). 
An examination of the present case will 
show that the petitioner voluntarily pled guilty 
at his trial. Petitioner was questioned by his 
attorney at the time he entered his plea to establish 
that he was aware of his constitutional rights and 
that he was voluntarily waiving them to enter his 
plea (T.A. 2-5)• 
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The record establishes that the appellant 
knew the nature of the charge against him and the 
consequences of his guilty plea (T. A. 3). Petitioner 
also stated that no improper promises or coercion 
had been used to induce his plea (T. A, 4). 
The decision to plead guilty was made with 
petitioner's approval with the hope that another charge 
pending aginat him would be dismissed (T.A.7). 
In light of these facts, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the decision to plead guilty was 
made on the likelihood that there was little possi-
bility of acquittal. The desire to limit the penalties 
which might have been imposed and the possibility 
of dropping several pending charges are all proper 
motivating factors. Brady v. United States, supra, 
at 752. If the petitioner makes a guilty plea with 
expectations of having other charges dropped and 
consequently those pending charges are not dropped, 
the Brady case states: 
"A defendant is not entitled 
to withdraw his plea merely because 
he discovers. . .(he has) misappre-
hended . . . the likely penalties 
attached to alternative courses of 
action." Brady v. United States, at 757. 
The fact that a defendant, against whom 
there are multiple charges pending, pleads guilty 
to one of them on condition that others be dropped 
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does not in and of itself compel a finding of coercion, 
Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 323 (1969). 
It should be noted however, that the other 
charges, discussed at the January 9, 19 74 arraignment, 
which were going to be dismissed at a later date, 
were in fact dismissed. The dismissal of the other 
charges was accomplished at the time of sentencing 
as is the normal practice in situations such as 
the present one. 
Plaintiff's plea was made intelligently in 
compliance with the mandate of Brady v. United States, 
supra, which provides that for a guilty plea to be 
given intelligently it must be shown that: 
nHe [appellant here] was advised 
by competent counsel, he was made 
aware of the nature of the charge 
against him, and there was nothing 
to indicate that he was incompetent 
or otherwise not in control of his 
mental facilities." IdL at 756. 
There is adequate showing of all of these 
elements in the record (T.A. 3-5). The record affirma-
tively shows that the petitioner intelligently entered 
a plea of guilty. He was advised by competent counsel, 
aware of the charges against him and knew the possible 
sentence he would receive. He was in full control of 
his mental faculties and understood the questions 
presented to him. There is explicit indication from 
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the record that plaintiff, his counsel, and the 
court understood that plaintiff was pleading guilty to 
attempted theft from a person, a third degree felony, 
carrying an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment 
not exceeding five years. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROM PETITIONING 
FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE THE ISSUES 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED IN A TIMELY APPEAL. 
I n
 Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 
P.2d 968 (1968), this court noted the accelerating 
use of petitions for writs of habeas corpus to review 
issues which could properly form the basis of appeal. 
There it was stated: 
11
 If the contention of error is 
something which is known or should be 
known to the party at the time the 
judgment was entered, it must be 
reviewed in the manner and within the 
time permitted by regular prescribed 
procedure, or the judgment becomes 
final and is not subject to further 
attack. . ." 440 P.2d at 969. 
In the presentcase, appellant should have known of any 
defects at the time of arraignment and thus is 
precluded from using habeas corpus as a substitute 
for regular appellate review. 
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Moreover, the present case is directly 
controlled by two recent Utah cases. In Hahn v. 
Turner, 530 P.2d 789 (1975), Hahn pleaded guilty to 
armed robbery and was sentenced accordingly. How-
ever, without appealing the sentence Hahn filed a 
petition for habeas corpus alleging that his guilty 
plea was not intelligently and voluntarily entered. 
This court held the appellant could or should have 
asserted his rights by a regular appeal, and his 
failure to do so precluded him from employing the 
habeas corpus process as a substitute for what 
should be a timely appeal. In Zuiribrunnen v. Turner, 
27 Utah 2d 428, 497 P.2d 34 (1972), where the day be-
fore appellant's trial setting he pleaded guilty 
to burglary upon dismissal of two similar charges 
and later claimed his plea was involuntary and 
unintelligent and that his counsel was incompetent, 
this court held that both points could have been 
urged on a regular appeal and the writ could not be 
used as a substitute for such appeal. 
In the present case appellant made no effort 
to pursue an appeal and there is no indication of 
any impediment existing which would have precluded 
him from raising the present issues on appeal. There 
is a presumptive indication from the record that 
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appellant was adequately apprised of his right to 
appeal (T.A. 4). In addition, appellant was represented 
by competent counsel at his arraignment and sentenc-
ing. Therefore, the issues raised in appellant's 
petition for writ of habeas corpus should be denied 
because they were not raised in a timely appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the appellant has not timely raised 
the issues involved herein, and he intelligently 
and voluntarily pleaded guilty to the crime of 
attempted theft of property from a person, the dis-
missal of the appellant's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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